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1 Introduction  
 
Chain-stores are becoming an increasingly significant form of retailing across 
UK high-streets. Many markets are now dominated by chain-store retailers including 
food supermarkets, clothes stores, restaurants and bars. In the UK retail sector 
multiple retailers increased their market share from around 23% in 1950 to 65% by 
19951 and casual observation suggests that this figure has continued to rise. Various 
empirical studies suggest that this has a negative effect on smaller independent 
retailers. There is therefore widespread concern in particular due to the effects on 
product choice and the impact on local economies.2   
 Deregulation of the opticians’ industry in the mid 1980s brought about many 
significant changes, particularly the removal of restrictions on advertising and the 
possibility of entry by unregistered suppliers.3  Since deregulation, there has been 
rapid entry and growth of chain-store retailers, who have rapidly increased their 
market share from 46% to 75% from 1985 to 19914 and since then have continued to 
grow in importance. However, these chain-stores also compete with independent 
retailers at a local level, at least in terms of consumer search behaviour. Also, the 
infrequency of purchases means consumers typically choose between one of the 
chain-stores or the independent retailers located within the local market. This is in 
contrast to other retail markets such as the supermarket industry, where consumers 
typically visit smaller convenience stores as well as ‘one-stop’ shops. These features 
mean the opticians’ industry is ideal for studying the effect chain-stores have on local 
market competition. For clarity, henceforth; outlet will be used to refer to an 
individual optician premise, chain-store to a chain of outlets under common 
ownership and chain-stores for several chains of outlets. In Section 3, a precise 
definition to distinguish between chain-stores and independents in the UK opticians’ 
market will be given. 
 This paper investigates competition and the nature and extent of 
product differentiation between chain-stores and independent retailers within local 
retail markets, using evidence on the relationship between the number of outlets 
present in a local market and market size in the UK opticians’ industry. The approach 
                                                 
1
 Burt and Sparks (2003).  
2
 See for example; Daunfeldt et al (2005), New Economics Foundation (2005) and House of Commons, 
All-Party Small Shops Group (2006).  
3
 See Davies et al (2004) Ch 2 for a discussion of the impact of deregulation on competition.  
4
 Figures from Fulop and Warren (1993).  
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taken in this paper draws on two separate but related streams of literature. First, 
following the tradition of Bresnahan and Reiss (B&R) (1991) inferences are drawn 
about competitive conduct by examining the size of market needed to support a given 
number of outlets. Recent literature has examined the determinants of entry more 
explicitly. Toivanen and Waterson (2005) for example, study the entry patterns of 
McDonalds and Burger King in the UK hamburger market. The presence of a rival 
store is found to provide information on market size and thus make entry more likely. 
Also, some evidence of product differentiation between firms is found.  
Based on the B&R approach Dinlersoz (2004) models competition in local 
markets between chain-stores and independent retailers using a model of vertical 
product differentiation, in which the independent retailers are assumed to provide a 
higher quality product. His model predicts how the number of independent and chain-
store retailers in a local market changes as the market size increases. The predictions 
of the model are supported by evidence from the Californian retail alcoholic beverage 
industry. In this industry the assumption that independent retailers produce a higher 
quality product (and therefore charge a higher price) is made as it is argued that they 
are niche firms selling more specialised products.  
Morton and Podolny (2002) suggest sellers’ utility maximization behaviour as 
an alternative explanation for independent retailers producing a higher quality product. 
Utility maximization behaviour is shown to prevent profit maximizing firms from 
entering niche, high quality segments of the market, with empirical evidence from the 
Californian wine industry. However, in other industries it appears that chain-stores 
charge higher prices than competing independent retailers. Loertscher and Schneider 
(2005) provide evidence on prices for bus tickets and a cup of coffee as examples 
where a chain-store retailer charges a higher price for a seemingly homogeneous 
product. The explanation given is that chain-stores located in numerous local markets, 
can charge higher prices to exploit the search costs faced by consumers who visit an 
unfamiliar local market but know the chain-store’s price from other markets. 
Importantly, the chain-store is assumed to set an identical price in all local markets, 
this strategic decision is the focus of the second, related stream of literature.                  
 This literature focuses on the strategies chain-stores adopt when competing in 
local markets. In particular the question of whether chain-stores set prices according 
to local market conditions or set an identical national price for all retail outlets owned. 
In a series of recent theoretical papers Dobson & Waterson (2005a 2005b) model this 
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strategic decision faced by chain-stores to show that under certain circumstances it 
can be profitable for a chain-store to set a national price. In contrast Montgomery 
(1997) suggests that a pricing strategy tailored to local market conditions can 
significantly increase a firm’s profit; however, the danger of a strategy of this kind is 
that it can affect a chain-store’s overall image. Evidence suggests that a significant 
number of important retail chain-stores adopt national pricing, for example, over half 
of the UK’s leading supermarkets set prices nationally and the competition authorities 
have expressed concern over the use of local pricing strategies.5 In the UK retail 
opticians’ market national pricing strategies are adopted by the large retail chains. The 
Dinlersoz approach will therefore be modified to account for chain-store national 
pricing strategies. In addition, extending the national pricing model to allow for 
heterogeneity between chain-stores means that empirical evidence of vertical product 
differentiation can be examined. Another important difference from the Dinlersoz 
paper is that this dataset, in addition to markets where chain-stores are present, 
includes local markets where only independent retailers are present. This allows 
important comparisons between markets with and without chain-stores to be made. 
 Section 2 combines the vertical product differentiation model used by 
Dinlersoz with a national chain-store pricing strategy. Then Section 3 describes the 
dataset collected on the UK retail opticians’ market and Section 4 presents the 
econometric results. In Section 5 the analysis is extended to allow for heterogeneous 
chain-stores and examine the extent of product differentiation. Section 6 further 
extends the analysis, firstly by considering the determinants of the number of chain-
stores present in a market and then comparing markets with and without chain-stores, 
finally Section 7 concludes.    
 
 
2 A model of retail competition 
  
A vertical product differentiation model is used based on that described in 
Dinlersoz (2004)6. The next section will outline the assumptions and then Section 2.2 
explains the predictions from the Dinlersoz model. Then, Section 2.3 adapts the 
Dinlersoz model to allow for chain-store national pricing strategies. The differing 
predictions from the model will then be tested empirically.  
                                                 
5
 Competition Commission (2000).  
6
 The assumptions of Section 2.1 and the results of Section 2.2 only differ from Dinlersoz (2004) in 
terms of the notation used.   
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2.1 Assumptions   
There are two types of firms; chain-stores (subscript C ) producing a low 
quality product, and a competitive fringe of independent retailers (subscript I ) 
producing a higher quality product. Each local market contains S consumers, 
consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality with a marginal utility from one unit 
of quality equal toα whereα  is uniformly distributed over an interval [ ],α α  with 
0>α and 1=−αα . In addition the market is assumed to be fully covered; i.e. all 
consumers buy one unit of the product from one of the independent or chain-store 
retailers. For a consumer of type α  the utility derived from a product of quality θ  
and price p is given by:                                                      
0
( , ; )
0
p if p
u p
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αθ αθ
θ α
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             (1)                                                                                                                              
The independent retailers are assumed to produce a good of exogenously determined 
quality Iθ  and all chain-stores produce a good of quality Cθ (the assumption of 
homogeneity between chain-stores well be relaxed in Section 5), again exogenously 
determined and with CI θθ > . The utility level of the consumer (denoted by *α ) 
indifferent between the product offered by the chain-stores and the independent stores 
can then be defined:   
 
)/()(* CICI pp θθα −−=        (2)  
 
Without loss of generality, the quality differential is normalised so that 1=− CI θθ . 
From (2) the local market demand functions for the independent retailers and the 
chain-stores can be derived: 
 
)(),( CICII ppSppD +−= α       (3)  
 
)(),( α−−= CIICC ppSppD         (4)  
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Fixed costs are denoted as f and variable costs as c . The independent retailers have a 
total cost function ( )IC  defined as:  
 
2
IIII qcfC +=         (5)  
 
This implies a U-shaped average cost function for the independent retailers. The 
chain-stores are assumed to have a total cost function ( )CC  with increasing returns to 
scale7 given by: 
 
( )C C C C CC q f c q= +         (6)  
 
Both the number of chain-store outlets and independent outlets are determined by the 
free entry equilibrium. The independent retailers in each local market, as price-takers 
in a perfectly competitive setting, compete the price down to the level where it is 
equal to marginal costs at the minimum efficient scale (MES):  
 
1/ 2
* ( / )I I Iq f c=         (7) 
 
1/ 2
* 2( )I I Ip f c=         (8) 
 
Because the independent retailers produce an output and set a price which is invariant 
to market size, the number of independent retailers in a local market depends only 
upon the total demand for the independents’ product. This depends upon the 
proportion of the market served by chain-stores and crucially, as will now be shown 
in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, differs according to the pricing strategies adopted by chain-
stores.     
      
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 The results, as explained in Dinlersoz (2004) pg216, do not require this specific cost function. 
However the minimum efficient scale for the chain-stores must be sufficiently greater than that for the 
independent retailers, as this enables the chain-stores to expand output as the market size increases.  
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2.2 Local pricing by chain-stores  
 
Dinlersoz assumes that all chain-stores, producing a product of equal quality, 
compete a la Cournot taking the price set by the independent retailers as given. The 
output of each chain-store is found to be8:    
 
1/ 2 1/ 2
*C Cq f S=         (9) 
 
The total chain-store output ( *)CQ is therefore:  
* * *C C CQ N q=         (10) 
 
Where *CN  is the equilibrium number of chain-store outlets in a local market. As the 
market is assumed to be fully covered, the independent retailers total output ( *)IQ can 
be expressed as:  
 
* * *I C CQ S N q= −         (11) 
 
The equilibrium number of independent outlets ( *)IN  is given by: 
 
 * * / *I I IN Q q=         (12) 
  
Substituting if for *Iq  from (7), *IQ  from (11) and *Cq  from (9): 
 
( )1/ 2 1/ 2 1/ 2* ( * ) /( / )I C C I IN S N f S f c= −       (13) 
 
Dinlersoz solves for *CN given by the Cournot free entry equilibrium taking *Ip  as 
given by (8), substituting for *CN  into (13) and rearranging gives9:  
    
( )( )* 1/ 2 1/ 2 1/ 2 1/ 2( / ) 2( )I I I C C C CN f c c c f S f Sα−= + − +    (14)  
                                                 
8
 See Dinlersoz pg 217. 
9
 See Dinlersoz (2004) pg 217.  
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Equation (14) shows that the number of independent outlets increases less than 
proportionately with an increase in the market size, this is because as the market size 
increases chain-store entry occurs, which leads to a fall in the chain-store price. 
Therefore, the number of chain-stores increases less than proportionately with an 
increase in market size, this is the B&R result described earlier. However, the fall in 
the chain-store price also affects the independent retailers’ share of the market. 
Crucially, some consumers will switch from the independents’ high quality product to 
the chain-stores’ lower quality product. Consequently, the number of independent 
outlets increases less than proportionately with an increase in the market size. As the 
number of chain-stores entering the local market continues to increase, additional 
chain-store entry has less of an effect on price and therefore fewer additional 
consumers switch from independent retailers to chain-stores. Therefore, as shown in 
Figure 1, as the market size increases further the number of independent outlets can 
increase almost proportionately with an increase in the market size.  
     
Figure 1: The number of independent retailers under chain-store local pricing 
 
 
Dinlersoz finds evidence of this relationship between the number of independent 
outlets and market size in the Californian retail alcoholic beverage industry.  
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2.3 National pricing by chain-stores 
 
 Dinlersoz assumes chain-store costs exhibit increasing returns to scale, chain-
stores produce a lower quality product than independents and chain-stores set prices 
locally. The first two of these assumptions appear to fit the UK opticians’ market 
relatively well, but the final one does not. Casual observation suggests chain-stores 
tend to employ a larger number of opticians, providing evidence of a higher minimum 
efficient scale even at the individual store level. The assumption that independent 
retailers supply a higher quality service could be justified in terms of a more personal 
service, with consumers benefiting from repeated interaction with the same 
ophthalmic practitioner. In fact, one of the concerns of opponents of deregulation was 
a reduction in service quality10. However, a crucial assumption in the Dinlersoz model 
is that in each local market chain-stores compete a la Cournot. This implies the price 
will vary according to the number of chain-stores present in the market (determined 
by the market size). However, as discussed above, the main retail opticians’ chain-
stores in the UK adopt national pricing strategies. This section considers the effect of 
altering the Dinlersoz model for chain-store national pricing strategies11.  
Suppose now that the chain-stores all set an exogenously determined price 
natp  which is invariant to the market size ( S ). The national price can be assumed to 
be exogenous as it will be determined by factors at a national level, where factors 
affecting an individual local market make up only a small part. The demand for the 
independent firm’s product therefore becomes:  
 
)(),( natICII ppSppD +−= α       (15) 
 
In addition, the output and price of an independent store remain unchanged as the 
number of independent outlets adjusts to ensure that the output of an individual outlet 
remains equal to MES as in (7). It is therefore possible to solve for the free entry 
equilibrium number of independent outlets ( *IN ): 
 
( ) 0./ * =−− IIIIII fqcpND        (16) 
 
                                                 
10
 See for example Fulop and Warren (1993) pp. 262-64. 
11
 Empirical evidence on the nature and extent of product differentiation will be considered in Section 6. 
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Substituting in for ID  from (15), Ip  from (8) and Iq  from (7):  
 
( ) 0/)()(2/)( 2/12/1* =−−+− IfIffIIInatI fcfccfcNppS α   (17) 
 
Simplifying and rearranging: 
 
IIInatII ffcppSN /))(( 2/1* +−= α       (18) 
 
Equation 18 shows that number of independent outlets increases at a rate proportional 
to the increase in market size, as shown in Figure 2. Because both chain-stores and 
independent firms now set a price that is invariant in the market size, the proportion of 
consumers preferring chain-stores to independent outlets and vice versa is fixed for all 
market sizes.  
 
Figure 2: The number of independent retailers under chain-store national pricing  
   
Comparing the results under national and local pricing leads to two propositions, 
which will be tested below. Comparing (14) and (18):   
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PROPOSITION 1:  
• If chain-stores use local pricing: the number of independent outlets will 
increase less than proportionately with an increase in market size but at an 
increasing rate.  
• If chain-stores use national pricing: the number of independent outlets will 
increase proportionately with an increase in market size, for all sizes of market.  
 
Comparing (13) and (18) implies: 
PROPOSITION 2:  
• With chain-store local pricing, the number of independent outlets is inversely 
related to the number of chain-stores present in the local market 
• If chain-stores use national pricing: the number of independent outlets is 
unaffected by the number of chain-stores present in the local market.  
 
Propositions 1 and 2 will now be tested on the dataset, described in Section 3, 
collected on the UK retail opticians market.   
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3 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
The dataset was obtained by downloading the names and postcodes of all 
opticians’ outlets in England and Wales from the online Yellow Pages directory.12 
Table 1 shows the number of outlets owned by the largest multi-store firms.   
  
Table 1: The largest multi-store opticians in England and Wales 
 
Chain Number of outlets 
Specsavers 412 
Dolland and Aitchison 338 
Boots  271 
Vision Express 169 
  
Scrivens 105 
Optical Express 104 
Rayner   97 
Batemans 54 
Leightons  41 
  
Others  4633 
  
 6224 
 
As can be seen, there is a clear natural break in the size distribution, with the top four 
owning more than 150 stores. Here after, these four will be referred to as chain-stores 
and all remaining outlets as independents:  
 
Definition: Chain-store – an opticians’ store owned by Specsavers (SS), Dolland and 
Aitchison (DA), Boots (BO) or Vision Express (VE).  
 
Of course, this definition of a ‘chain-store’ is somewhat arbitrary, but there are a 
number of reasons for differentiating these four from smaller, multi-store firms. 13  
First, as shown in Table 2.1 all four have a national presence, with stores in all 
regions, with similar rankings in all regions.   
 
 
                                                 
12
 www.yell.com 
13
 The main econometric results were also re-estimated with the definition of a chain-store widened, see 
footnote 19.  
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Table 2.1: The proportion of the total number of chain-store outlets in a region owned 
by each chain-store     
 
Region Number 
LAD 
markets 
Number 
chain-
stores 
% 
Specsavers 
% 
Dolland 
and 
Aitchison 
% 
Boots 
% 
Vision 
Express  
North-
East 
 
23 49 41 24 18 16 
North-
West 
 
43 140 36 28 21 15 
South-
East 
 
67 215 31 28 27 14 
South-
West 
 
44 129 41 24 21 14 
East 
 
46 129 33 19 33 14 
East 
Mid 
 
40 88 34 30 22 15 
West 
Mid 
 
33 131 28 36 19 17 
London 
 
33 166 28 40 19 13 
Yorks 
& Hum 
 
21  95 39 24 22 15 
Wales 
 
22 48 60 17 17 6 
 
On the other hand, as can be seen from Table 2.2, with the possible exception of 
Optical Express the other, main multi-store firms do not have a national presence. 
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Table 2.2: The distribution of selected firm’s total number of outlets by region 
 North-
East 
North-
West 
South-
East 
South-
West 
East 
 
East 
Mid 
West 
Mid 
London Yorks 
& 
Hum 
Wales 
 
Scrivens 
 
0 3 16 19 9 16 25 0 12 0 
Optical 
Express 
 
4 16 13 9 5 11 10 20 12 1 
Rayner 
 
3 10 7 1 2 16 15 0 20 25 
Batemans 
 
0 0 59 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Leightons 
 
0 0 76 12 2 0 0 10 0 0 
 
The Optical Express chain, established in 1991, has grown rapidly, and if it continues 
to expand as rapidly will soon join the group of main chain-store retailers. 
Interestingly, Optical Express adopts a local pricing strategy.  
Second, the four chain-stores, in addition to being the largest chains are also 
the firms in the market with a significant brand name and prominence as a high street 
retailer. Advertising figures suggest the dominance of these four chain-stores, as in 
2001 they together accounted for 75% of the UK main media advertising expenditure 
on opticians and eye clinics.14  In addition, all prices set by both Specsavers and Boots 
are national prices. Dolland and Aitchison and Vision Express also set the prices for 
frames and sight tests nationally.15 Based on this definition, chain-stores therefore 
make up 19% of the total, of just over 6200 outlets in the dataset. 
Table 3 describes the number of opticians for all 372 Local Authority Districts 
(LAD) in England and Wales, with N inds. used to refer to the number of independent 
outlets. 1 LADs tend to be centred on town/cities and therefore represent a reasonable 
approximation of the area in which consumer search behaviour takes place, as well as 
a unit of observation for which data is readily available.  
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Keynote (2002).  
15
 There are some small differences in the prices of lenses between markets, and franchisee stores have 
some autonomy over prices. However, the prices set can still be considered to be predominantly 
nationally determined.    
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Table 3: The number of opticians’ outlets by LAD market  
 Mean  Std Dev  Min Max 
Total  
 
16.73 13.82 1 161 
Chain-
stores 
 
1.90 1.31 0 4 
Chain-store 
outlets 
 
3.20 2.40 0 21 
N inds. 
 
13.53 12.17 1 140 
SS 
 
1.11 0.81 0 5 
DA 
 
0.91 1.04 0 9 
BO 
 
0.73 0.71 0 4 
VE 
 
0.45 0.55 0 3 
 
A ‘typical’ LAD market contains 17 opticians’ outlets; 3 chain-store outlets and 14 
independent outlets. However, clearly many markets contain more and there are 42 
markets in which there are no chain-stores. In addition, all chain-stores have multiple 
outlets in one or more LAD. Figure 3 shows the frequency distribution for the total 
number of opticians in a market. Clearly the distribution is skewed to the right, with 
74% of markets containing less than 20 outlets. 
 
Figure 3: The number of opticians’ outlets in an LAD market 
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Finally, Figure 4 shows the relationship between the total number of opticians’ outlets 
present and the population of the market. As we would expect, there is clearly a 
positive relationship between this definition of market size and the number of 
opticians located in the market. 
 
Figure 4: The number of opticians’ outlets by LAD population  
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4 Econometric results  
 
 In this section Propositions 1 and 2 will be tested against the data. Section 4.1 
outlines the econometric specification used and then Section 4.2 presents the results.  
 
4.1 Econometric specification and explanatory variables  
 
The general econometric specification used is: 
 
log log( ) *log( ) ( )i i i i i i iN Population C C Population Xα β δ φ γ ε= + + + + +     (19)  
 
Where the subscript i refers to an LAD market, iN  is the number of independent 
outlets, iC  is a continuous variable for the number of chain-stores. 
og( )iL Population is the natural logarithm of the LAD population and iX  is a vector of 
demand and cost control variables as described in Table 4.1 below. The error term iε  
is assumed to be independent across LAD markets. The model will be estimated using 
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OLS and the log-linear specification means that the estimated coefficients can be 
interpreted as the proportional change in iN  given a change in the explanatory 
variable.  
The use of LAD districts to define the market allows the data on the number of 
outlets to be matched with census demographic data, including importantly population 
as a measure of market size and other variables that can then be used to control for 
cost and other possible demand differentials between markets. Table 4.1 provides 
definitions for the demographic variables that will be used and Table 4.2 provides 
descriptive statistics for these variables. 
 
Table 4.1: Description of Demographic variables   
 
Variable Description 
Population 
 
LAD population (number of people) 
Density 
 
Number of people per hectare 
Age 
  
Mean age of LAD population (years)  
Wage 
 
 
Mean weekly wage of LAD population 
excluding overtime (£) 
Inc support  
 
 
% of LAD population claiming income 
support  
All variables are for 2001, Source: Census 2001 16 except wage data for 2005, Source: 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 200517. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for Demographic variables   
 
 Mean Std Dev  Min  Max 
Population 13906.23 91781.6 7185 977087 
Density 13.47 19.73 0.23 131.02 
Age  39.29 2.30 31.75 46.85 
Wage  412.45 103.04 237.4 1251.8 
Inc support 0.061 0.024 0.019 0.150 
 
Density allows for the possibility that more densely populated areas may attract 
additional opticians’ outlets, perhaps as they act as centre for retail activity and thus 
                                                 
16
 www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/  
17
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_labour/ASHE_2005/2005_res_la.pdf 
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attract customers from outside the LAD. The inclusion of age, controls for the 
likelihood that the demand for opticians’ services is higher, and typically more 
complex sight problems exist amongst older people. The wage variable has two 
possible interpretations; firstly it could reflect firms’ cost differences between markets 
or it could reflect higher demand due to a more affluent population.  Income support 
claimants are entitled to an NHS voucher, which provides the recipient with a free 
sight test and discounted spectacles or contact lenses. It is therefore plausible that 
demand could be higher in LADs with more income support claimants and for this 
reason is included as an additional explanatory variable. The inclusion of these 
explanatory variables will also provide important evidence in support of the 
assumptions made in the vertical differentiation model.  
 
4.2 Testing the relationship between the number of independent retailers and 
market size  
 
In order to test Propositions 1 and 2; the relationship between the number of 
independents and market size and the effect of the number of chain-stores, the sample 
will be restricted to those markets where one or more chain-store is present18.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 The dataset used for the regressions reported in Table 5 are all 330 markets in which one or more 
chain-store is present, with the exception of the City of London LAD. This was omitted from all the 
econometric results as it is principally a business area with a very low population but a comparatively 
large number of opticians’ outlets.  
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Table 5: The relationship between the number of independent outlets and market size 
and the effect of the number of chain-stores  
 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS  
                                  Dep var:           
 
Exp vars: 
Log (N inds.) Log (N inds.) 
Constant 
 
 
-19.520 *** 
(2.009) 
-17.263 *** 
(2.344) 
Log (Population) 
 
 
1.079 *** 
(0.048) 
0.949 *** 
(0.116) 
Log (Age)  
 
 
1.938 *** 
(0.408) 
1.761 *** 
(0.413) 
Log (Wage) 
 
 
0.495 *** 
(0.126)  
0.483 *** 
(0.127) 
Log (Inc support) 
 
 
0.283 *** 
(0.068) 
0.262 *** 
(0.069) 
N Chain-stores  
 
 
 -0.710 * 
(0.420) 
N Chain-stores  
* Log (Population) 
 
 0.058  
(0.036) 
N 329 329  
Adj Rsq 0.705 0.709  
*** Significantly different from 0 at 1% level   ** Significantly different from 0 at 5% level 
* Significantly different from 0 at 10% level       Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
The equation is tested in two forms; with and without the inclusion of the number of 
chain-stores present and the interaction with Log(Population) as explanatory variables. 
In both cases, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on log 
(Population) is equal to one:  
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RESULT 1  
• In markets where one or more chain-store is present the number of 
independent outlets increases proportionately with an increase in market size. 
This is consistent with chain-store national pricing strategies (see Proposition 1)19.  
 
In addition markets with an older population also have more independent outlets, 
suggesting demand is higher in these markets. The number of independent outlets is 
also increasing in both the average wage of the LAD population and the proportion of 
income support claimants; this will be discussed in more detail at the end of this 
section20.     
 Finally in relation to Proposition 2, with the inclusion of the number of chain-
stores present and the interaction with Log (Population) as explanatory variables, the 
number of chain-stores has a negative effect and is weakly significant. In addition, the 
results from F-tests of joint significance show that these extra explanatory variables, 
included in regression (2) are jointly significant at the 5% level. Additional results, 
not reported here, instead include the number of chain-store outlets as the explanatory 
variable, however neither variable was individually or jointly significant. Overall, the 
results therefore provide some evidence that the number of chain-stores rather than 
the number of chain-store outlets affects the number of independent outlets and this 
will be examined further in Section 5.        
 
5 Heterogeneous chain-stores  
 
The theory described in Section 2 assumes that all chain-stores supply 
identical quality. This assumption is now relaxed.  
 
5.1 A model of retail competition with national pricing but heterogeneous chain-
stores  
 
The following analysis can easily be generalised to the case where there are 
any number of chain-stores; however, as an illustration consider the following 
                                                 
19
 This result is robust to various sensitivity tests: excluding Scrivens, Optical Express and Rayner 
outlets from the definition of independent retailers, excluding the largest 10% or 25% of markets, or 
excluding all London LADs.   
20
 Log (Density) was also included but was insignificant.  
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example where there are only two chain-stores, denoted 1 and 2. Assume Chain-store 
1 produces a higher quality product than Chain-store 2 i.e.21; 
 
1 2C Cθ θ>          (20) 
  
In order for Chain-store 2 to be active it must therefore be the case that: 
 
1 2C nat C natp p>          (21) 
There are potentially three different types of local market:  
Type i): Markets with Chain-store 1 and 2 present.  
Type ii): Markets with only Chain-store 1 present.   
Type iii): Markets with only Chain-store 2 present.  
 
Consider first of all Type i) markets with both Chain-store 1 and 2 present. As before, 
we can consider the consumer with a marginal willingness to pay for quality such that 
he is indifferent between two different types of quality of retailer. However, as there 
are now three different product quality levels being offered in the market there are 
now two types of indifferent consumers. First define the consumer indifferent 
between the products offered by the two chain-stores as having a marginal willingness 
to pay for quality of level 12α , where: 
 
12 1 1 12 2 2C C nat C C natp pα θ α θ− = −       (22) 
 
and therefore; 
 
12 1 2 1 2( ) /( )C nat C nat C Cp pα θ θ= − −       (23)  
 
Therefore, assuming as before that the market is always covered, consumers with a 
marginal willingness to pay for quality in the range 12α α α≤ <  buy from the low 
quality chain-store; Chain-store 2. Proceeding in a similar fashion we can then denote 
                                                 
21
 Allowing for these different, exogenously determined quality levels relaxes the earlier assumption 
that 1=− CI θθ  however, under the assumption of national pricing this is unimportant.  
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marginal willingness to pay for quality of the consumer indifferent between the high 
quality chain-store; Chain-store 1 and the independent outlet(s) producing an even 
higher quality product as 1Iα , where: 
 
1 1 1( ) /( )I I C nat I Cp pα θ θ= − −        (24) 
 
Clearly for markets of Type i) to exist22: 
 
1 12Iα α>          (25) 
Therefore, consumers with 1Iα α α< ≤  buy from one of the independent outlets and 
consumers with  12 1Iα α α< <  buy from Chain-store 1.  
We can now consider markets where only one of the two chain-stores is 
located, first of all consider markets of Type ii) where only Chain-store 1 competes 
with the independent retailers. This means that only one indifferent consumer needs to 
be considered; the consumer indifferent between Chain-store 1 and the independent 
retailers however, this consumer has already been defined for Type i) markets and 
therefore for this consumer;  
 
1Iα α=          (26) 
 
Because the market is assumed to be fully covered, consumers who would prefer to 
buy from Chain-store 2 (as shown in Type i) markets) instead buy from Chain-store 1 
in Type ii) markets as Chain-store 2 is not present.  
 The final type of markets to consider are those in which only the low quality 
chain-store (Chain-store 2) and independent retailers are present i.e. Type iii) markets. 
Denote the marginal willingness to pay for quality for a consumer indifferent between 
Chain-store 2 and an independent retailer as 2Iα , where: 
  
2 2 2( ) /( )I I C nat I Cp pα θ θ= − −        (27) 
 
                                                 
22
 If 1 12Iα α=  then consumers in the market either buy from the low quality chain-store (Chain-store 
2) or from an independent retailer, Chain-store 1 has no demand.   
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The Appendix proves that: 
 
12 2 1I Iα α α< <         (28) 
 
The intuition is that when Chain-store 1 is not present in a local market, assuming that 
the market remains fully covered, the consumers that would have preferred Chain-
store 1 have a choice between Chain-store 2 and the independent retailers. A 
proportion of those consumers will prefer the higher quality product of the 
independent retailers whilst others with a lower willingness to pay for quality will 
prefer to buy from Chain-store 2.    
The implication of this result is that the number of independent firms present 
in the market will depend on whether or not Chain-store 1 (the high quality chain-
store) is a competitor in the local market. If Chain-store 1 is present the number of 
independent firms is lower than if only Chain-store 2 is present. Formally; the 
independent retailers demand can be expressed as:  
 
)~( αα −= SDI         (29) 
where:  
1
2
) )
)
I
I
in Type i and type ii markets
in Type iii markets
α
α
α


= 


%
     (30) 
 
Therefore as before the number of independent retailers is given by:  
 
( ) 0./ * =−− IIIIII fqcpND        (31) 
 
Substituting in for ID , simplifying and rearranging gives:  
 
IIII ffcSN /))(~(/ 2/1* αα −=       (32) 
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Proposition 3 follows from the result shown in (32):    
 
PROPOSITION 3: 
For a given market size; *IN  is higher in Type iii) markets i.e. those where Chain-
store 2 (the lower quality chain-store) is the only chain-store present compared to 
Type i) and ii) markets i.e. markets where Chain-store 1 (the higher quality chain-
store) is present.  
 
More generally the number of independent retailers is determined by the highest 
quality chain-store present in the local market. The simple case with only two chain-
stores can be illustrated diagrammatically:   
 
Figure 5: The number of independent retailers under chain-store national pricing 
with heterogeneous quality chain-stores 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Econometric results  
 
Potentially, the evidence from the previous section, that the number of chain-
stores affects the number of independents’ outlets, can be explained by chain-store 
heterogeneity. As the number of chain-stores increases, this increases the probability 
that a higher quality chain-store is present in the market. In order to allow for 
IN  
S  
Chain-store 1 
present (with 
or without 
chain-store 2)  
(Type i) & ii)) 
Only Chain-
store 2 present 
(Type iii)) 
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heterogeneous chain-stores and test Proposition 3, a series of new dummy variables 
will be added to the basic specification used in Section 4; Table 4 (1). These dummy 
variables capture the presence of each chain-store individually and therefore the effect 
of this chain-store can be compared to the alternative; the presence of one or more of 
the other chain-stores. 23  Separate regressions were then estimated including the 
presence of each chain-store in turn. The results reported in Table 6 (1) are for the 
only one of these four regressions in which the added dummy variables were 
individually significant; the inclusion of dummy variables for a Boots outlet.  In 
addition, Table 6 (2) reports the results from including separate dummy variables 
capturing the presence of each of the four chain-stores.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 A more detailed approach could be used; including in a single regression the additional effect of each 
chain-store in turn and redefining the dummy variables to consider all the possible rankings according 
to quality. However, the dataset does not include enough variability in different chain-store presence 
between markets.  
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Table 6: The effect of the number and identity of chain-stores on the number of 
independent opticians’ outlets in a local market 
 
  
(1) OLS 
 
(2) OLS 
                             Dep var:           
Exp vars: 
Log (N inds.) Log (N inds.)  
Constant  
 
-18.088 *** 
(2.156) 
-16.400 *** 
(2.642)  
Log (Population) 
 
 
0.968 *** 
(0.081) 
0.901 *** 
(0.159) 
Log (Age)  
 
 
1.863 *** 
(0.409) 
1.723 *** 
(0.417) 
Log (Wage)  
 
 
0.517 *** 
(0.127) 
0.492 *** 
(0.129) 
Log (Inc support)  
 
 
0.284 *** 
(0.069) 
0.291 *** 
(0.069)  
Boots  
[222] 
-1.957 * 
(1.036) 
 
Boots * Log (Population) 
 
 
0.166 * 
(0.089) 
 
Dum SS 
[302] 
 -0.701 
(1.606) 
Dum DA 
[227] 
 -1.407  
(1.274)  
Dum BO 
[222] 
 -2.397 * 
(1.255) 
Dum VE  
[159] 
 
 1.502  
(1.326)  
Dum SS * Log (Population) 
 
 0.045 
(0.138) 
Dum DA * Log (Population) 
 
 0.109 
(0.109) 
Dum BO* Log (Population)  
 
 0.205 * 
(0.108) 
Dum VE * Log (Population)   -0.124 
(0.113) 
 
N 329 329 
Adj Rsq 0.707 0.713 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 1% level   ** Significantly different from 0 at 5% level 
* Significantly different from 0 at 10% level       Standard errors in parenthesis 
 […] frequency dummy variable =1  
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The results from Table 6 (1), suggest that the presence of a Boots outlet has an 
additional effect on the number of independent outlets compared to one of the other 
chain-stores. However, an F-test suggests that the Boots dummy variable and the 
interaction with log (Population) are not jointly significant. A similar Boots effect is 
observed in Table 6 (2), however, now an F-test suggests that all four chain-store 
dummy variables and the interaction terms are jointly significant at the 5% level.  
 
RESULT 2: 
 
• There is weak evidence to suggest that the presence of a Boots’ outlet reduces 
the number of independent outlets in the market, compared to markets with no 
Boots’ outlet, but where one or more of the other chain-stores are present.24  
 
In the context of the vertical differentiation model, the implication of Result 2 is that 
Boots produces a higher quality product than the other chain-stores. Additional 
evidence of this quality difference is suggested in the earlier table; Table 2.1, where 
Boots is particularly prominent in the South-East and the East. If the regions are 
ranked according to average regional wage, these with the exception of London are 
the two highest. In addition, Boots arguably benefits from a long established brand 
name in other related retail segments including other health-care products and this 
may distinguish Boots from the other opticians’ chain-stores. 
 This potential quality differential between chain-stores provides one 
explanation for the earlier result, suggesting that the number of chain-stores outlets 
affects the number of independent outlets. However, alternative explanations for this 
result are firstly, the possibility that despite the use of national pricing strategies local 
competition could remain important. It is highly plausible that some form of non-price 
competition, such as service quality, increases the more chain-stores are present in the 
local market. This could for example take the form of hiring extra staff or making a 
higher sales effort. This would therefore imply that a given chain-store differs in 
quality between markets. Alternatively, local promotions or advertising could be more 
intense in markets where more chain-stores are present. Secondly, some form of 
horizontal product differentiation such as location decisions within markets may also 
                                                 
24
 Calculations (not reported), using the results from Table 6 (1), show that the estimated number of 
independent outlets is lower in the presence of a Boots chain-store compared to markets with only 
other chain-stores up to a relatively large market size.   
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be important. It could be that an increase in the number of chain-store outlets in a 
market affects the location decisions of independent outlets, for example forces them 
to locate further from a city centre and therefore reduces their share of the market.        
 
6 Extensions  
 The empirical analysis is now extended it two ways; Section 6.1 considers the 
determinants of the number of chain-stores in a local market and Section 6.2 compares 
the number of independents in markets with and without chain-stores.  
 
6.1 The number of chain-stores in a local market  
  So far all of the analysis has focused on the determinants of the number of 
independent opticians’ outlets in a market. In contrast to the Dinlersoz model, where 
both the number of chain-stores and the number of independents in a local market are 
determined by the free entry equilibrium, the model in Section 2.2 with national 
pricing makes no predictions on the number of chain-stores present in a local market. 
As the chain-store price is set at a national level, each chain-store’s decision on entry 
into a local market has to be considered in the context of its effect on the national 
price. Thus whilst the national price can be considered as exogenous within a local 
market, it is clearly endogenous as far as entry decisions are concerned. However, 
further evidence on the nature and extent of product differentiation can be obtained by 
examining the determinants of the number of chain-stores and chain-store outlets in a 
local market. Due to the nature of the dependent variable this is done by using ordered 
probit analysis. Table 7 (1) reports the results with the number of chain-stores as the 
dependant variable (ranging from 0 to 4 and bounded at 4) and Table 7 (2) with the 
number of chain-store outlets as the dependant variable (ranging from 0 to 21 and 
unbounded).        
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Table 7: The determinants of the number of chain-stores and chain-store outlets 
present in a local market 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Ordered Probit  
(2) 
Ordered Probit  
                                  Dep var:           
Exp vars: 
N chain-stores 
 
N chain-store outlets 
Log (Population) 
 
 
1.216 *** 
(0.155)  
1.628 *** 
(0.147) 
Log (Age)  
 
 
-1.491  
(1.319) 
-1.424  
(1.251) 
Log (Density)  
 
 
0.227 *** 
(0.067) 
0.158 ** 
(0.062)  
Log (Wage)  
 
 
-1.172 *** 
(0.392) 
-0.449  
(0.367) 
Log (Inc support)  
 
 
-0.706 *** 
(0.218) 
-0.441 ** 
(0.206) 
N 
 
371 371 
Log L 
 
-495.975 -670.045 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 1% level   ** Significantly different from 0 at 5% level  
* Significantly different from 0 at 10% level       Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
As we would expect, both the number of chain-stores and the number of chain-store 
outlets are increasing in LAD population. In addition the effect of age is negative but 
insignificant; therefore comparisons with the earlier results suggest that independent 
opticians appeal to an older customer than chain-store opticians. In addition the 
results suggest that both the number of chain-store outlets and chain-stores are higher 
in more densely populated markets and the number of chain-stores is higher in 
markets with a lower average wage. If the effect of a lower average wage is compared 
to the results in Table 5: 
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RESULT 3:  
• The number of independent outlets in a market is higher in markets where the 
average wage is higher.  
• The number of chain-stores in a market is higher in markets where the average 
wage is lower. 
Thus, supporting the assumption in the vertical product differentiation model, that 
independent opticians produce a higher quality product than chain-stores25.  
 
As shown in Tables 5 the number of independent outlets increases in the 
proportion of income support claimants. In contrast, the results in Table 7 suggest that 
the number of chain-stores and chain-store outlets declines as the proportion of 
income support claimants rises, importantly having controlled for the average wage. 
This suggests that the increased demand created by the NHS voucher scheme in 
markets with a large proportion of income support claimants, benefits independent 
rather than chain-stores retailers.    
 
6.2 A comparison of markets with and without chain-stores 
 The preceding analysis has shown that the number of independent outlets 
increases proportionately with an increase in market size, for markets in which one or 
more chain-store is present. However, as the dataset also contains markets where no 
chain-stores are present, this provides a useful comparator to compare the impact of 
chain-store presence. Table 8 shows the effect one or more chain-stores have on the 
number of independent opticians’ outlets in a local market. Table 8(2) includes a 
dummy variable; dum chain, which is equal to one for the markets where one or more 
chain-stores are present, and in addition is interacted with log (Population).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Importantly, this assumes that wage differences between markets capture demand rather than cost 
differences.  
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Table 8: The effect of chain-stores on the number of independent opticians’ outlets in 
a local market 
 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS  
                                  Dep var:           
 
Exp vars: 
Log (N inds.)   Log (N inds.) 
Constant -18.927 *** 
(2.068)  
-15.443 *** 
(2.672) 
Log (Population) 
 
 
1.067 *** 
(0.048) 
0.751 *** 
(0.161) 
Log (Age)  
 
 
1.773 *** 
(0.456)  
1.805 *** 
(0.455) 
Log (Density) 
 
 
-0.010  
(0.022)  
-0.007  
(0.022)  
Log (Wage) 
 
 
0.521 *** 
(0.134)  
0.495 *** 
(0.134) 
Log (Inc support) 
 
 
0.282 *** 
(0.074)  
0.257 *** 
(0.075) 
Dum chain 
[329] 
 
 -3.792 ** 
(1.862) 
Dum chain* Log (Population) 
 
 
 0.340 ** 
(0.166) 
N 371 371 
Adj Rsq 0.694 0.696 
*** Significantly different from 0 at 1% level   ** Significantly different from 0 at 5% level  
* Significantly different from 0 at 10% level       Standard errors in parenthesis 
[…] frequency dummy variable =1    
 
 
For regression (1) in Table (8), a one tailed-test at the 5% level is unable to reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient on log (Population) is equal to one as opposed to 
the alternative hypothesis that it is less than one. For regression (2), in markets where 
chain-stores are present the proportionate increase in the number of independent 
outlets as market size increases, is given by the sum of the coefficients on log 
(Population) and dum chain * log (Population). A one tailed t-test at the 5% level 
does not reject the hypothesis that these two coefficients are jointly equal to one. 
These results therefore, provide additional evidence supporting Result 1. In contrast, a 
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one tailed t-test at the 5% level can now reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on 
log (Population) is equal to one. In addition, an F-test shows that dum chain and dum 
chain * log (population) are jointly significant at the 10% level.   
 
 
RESULT 4: 
 
• In markets with no chain-stores; the number of independent outlets increases 
less than proportionately with an increase in market size26.  
 
In contrast to Result 1 therefore, in markets where no chain-stores are present 
competition takes place between the independent retailers in the manner outlined by 
B&R. Interestingly, this result suggests that the nature of competition between the 
independent opticians depends on whether a chain-store is present.  
 
7 Conclusion 
 
 This paper has presented a theoretical model illustrating that the relationship 
between the number of independent outlets and market size will differ depending on 
whether chain-stores adopt local or national pricing strategies. Testing the theoretical 
predictions on a dataset from the UK retail opticians’ market the results are, in most 
respects, consistent with a model of vertical product differentiation in which chain-
stores adopt national pricing strategies. From a policy perspective the results suggest 
that chain-store national pricing strategies can protect independent retailers from the 
intense competition that could arise under local pricing between chain-stores in large 
markets where several chain-stores interact. This therefore provides evidence to 
justify policymakers concern over chain-store local pricing strategies, see for example 
Competition Commission (2000).    
Independent retailers were found to be more frequent in markets with higher 
average wages and in contrast more chain-stores are located in markets with lower 
average wages. This supports the assumption, made in the vertical model, that 
independent retailers produce a higher quality product than chain-stores. In addition 
the dataset allows comparisons between markets with and without chain-stores to be 
                                                 
26
 This result continues to hold if Scrivens, Optical Express and Rayner outlets are excluded from the 
definition of independent retailers.  
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made. Chain-store presence in a local market has been shown to have a significant 
effect on the relationship between the number of independent outlets and market size.  
In addition there is some weak evidence of heterogeneity amongst chain-stores, more 
specifically there is some evidence that Boots’ product is of a higher quality than the 
other chain-stores. One explanation for this is the potential importance of Boots’ long 
established brand name from other product markets. The results provide some 
evidence, inconsistently with the theory, that the number of chain-stores present also 
affects the number of independent retailers. Some possible explanations have already 
been discussed and these merit further investigation.    
Possible extensions to the paper would therefore include; first of all allowing 
chain-stores to make endogenous quality choices. An interesting implication is that 
this would allow for the endogenous escalation of sunk costs as described by Sutton 
(1991) and thus provides an addition constraint on the increase in outlets present in a 
market as the market size increases. An important question then becomes whether a 
chain-store’s quality is nationally determined or varies to reflect local market 
competition. It would be interesting to conduct an empirical investigation into the 
significance of non-price competition across local markets in particular looking for 
the possibility of differences between a given chain-store’s outlets. In addition, the 
fact that the most recent of the main chain-stores to enter the market; Optical Express, 
is the only one of the five chain-stores to use a local pricing strategy could also be an 
interesting area for further study. More generally, it would be interesting to consider 
the determinants of chain-store entry under national as compared to local pricing 
strategies. Finally, the empirical analysis in this paper has been restricted to cross-
sectional analysis, however the availability of time-series data would allow entry and 
location decisions to be examined and for example the long-term impact of chain-
store entry on independent retailers could be investigated. Information on the timing 
of entry would allow the use of empirical methods similar to those used in Toivanen 
and Waterson (2005). Chain-store entry could then be investigated in an industry 
where there are a significant number of both independent and chain-store retailers.      
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Appendix  
 
In Type i) markets, consumers with a marginal willingness to pay for quality such 
that:  
1Iα α α≤ ≤            (33) 
Weakly prefer Chain-store 1 to an independent retailer (i.e. either prefers Chain-store 
1 or is indifferent between the two).  
 
Consumers with a marginal willingness to pay for quality such that:  
12α α α≤ ≤           (34) 
Weakly prefer Chain-store 2 to Chain-store 1.  
 
Combining (33) and (34) and given that 12 1Iα α<  (see Footnote 22) therefore means 
that consumers with:  
12α α α≤ ≤           (35) 
Prefer Chain-store 2 to an independent retailer.  
 
Therefore a consumer with 12α α α≤ ≤  in Type ii) markets where only Chain-store 2 
and independent retailers are present must prefer Chain-store 2 to the independent 
retailers. i.e;  
12 2Iα α<          (36) 
Similarly in Type i) markets, consumers with a marginal willingness to pay for quality 
such that:  
1Iα α α≤ ≤            (37) 
Weakly prefer an independent retailer to Chain-store 1.  
 
Consumers with a marginal willingness to pay for quality such that:  
12α α α≤ ≤           (38) 
Weakly prefer Chain-store 1 to Chain-store 2.  
 
(37) and (38) together, and given that 12 1Iα α< , means that consumers with:  
1Iα α α≤ ≤          (39) 
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Prefer chain-store an independent retailer to Chain-store 2.  
Therefore a consumer with 1Iα α α< ≤  in Type ii) markets where only Chain-store 2 
and independent retailers are present must prefer an independent retailer to Chain-
store 2 i.e.;  
2 1I Iα α<
         (40) 
Combining (36) and (40) gives: 
 12 2 1I Iα α α< <         (41)  
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